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ADVANCING QUALITY COMPETITION
IN BIG DATA MARKETS
Adrian Kuenzler∗
ABSTRACT
The European Commission in its decision in Google Search (Shopping) found
that a dominant search engine abused its market power by giving preferential
treatment to its own related services over those of rivals. Conventional market
mechanisms, it is supposed, can no longer correct the harm arising from such
conduct. But there is disagreement in legal scholarship as to what this harm
actually represents. This article maintains that the practice of self-favouring is
best understood as an attempt to ward off product quality degradations in digital
markets, which are difficult to repair purely by means of the consumer’s sole
ability to switch. Framed against Albert Hirschman’s well-known work on Exit,
Voice, and Loyalty, the Commission’s ruling must be understood as recognition
that rivalry stemming from smaller market actors will not necessarily prevent
large platforms from degrading product quality, despite the consumer’s ability to
gain access to a variety of services that are only a click away.The article explicates
the market’s functioning and the available methods of recuperation against the
backdrop of the available case law in this area, and expounds the Commission’s
findings in light of Hirschman’s theory.
JEL: B31,D01,D11,D18,D21,D40,D50,D60,K21,K23, L15, L40
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital markets increasingly pose a conundrum for competition authorities
and courts. Technological advances in the collection of users’ data promise
to be transformative, contributing to rapid innovation, the instant growth
of new products, superior quality services, and personalized experiences.
But the emergence of big data sometimes fails to enhance consumers’
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Advancing Quality Competition in Big Data Markets 501
well-being, as a sequence of recent competition law investigations demon-
strate.1 Particularly in two-sided markets, where digital platforms vie to attract
users by rendering services without charge while at the same time earning
profits from advertisers through exchanging users’ data for a fee, platform
operators may have the incentive and the power to prioritize maximizing
income over providing consumers with better quality offerings.2
The most significant recent instances in the scholarly debate around quality
deterioration in online markets involve web search engines such as those
offered by Amazon’s marketplace or Google, which have been found to
promote the companies’ own products over competitors’ listings, employing
the platform’s user data to gain a competitive advantage in the struggle
over rival suppliers. The European Commission, in the recent case of Google
Search (Shopping), found that discriminatory treatment of competitors by a
vertically integrated search engine may amount to an abuse under Article 102
TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) if a dominant
search engine systematically gives prominent placement to its own comparison
shopping service and demotes rival comparison shopping services in its search
results. In the Commission’s view, such conduct unduly diverts traffic away
from the dominant company’s competitors towards the dominant company’s
own related services, affording the dominant company’s private label products
an anticompetitive advantage.3 In studying the legal standard by which the
Commission assessed this practice, commentators have raised questions as to
whether the Commission has gone so far as to stipulate a general responsibility
for vertically integrated firms not to discriminate against their competitors in
1 See in particular Case AT.39740—Google Search (Shopping), 27 June 2017, C(2017) 4444
final; Case AT.40462—Amazon Marketplace, ongoing; European Commission Press Release:
Commission Opens Investigation into Possible Anti-Competitive Conduct of Amazon,
July 17, 2019 <https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-4291_en.htm> accessed 15
November 2019; Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets Launches Investigation into
Abuse of Dominance by Apple in its App Store, April 11, 2019 <https://www.acm.nl/en/
publications/acm-launches-investigation-abuse-dominance-apple-its-app-store> accessed 15
November 2019; Italian Antitrust Authority Press Release: Amazon Investigation Launched
on Possible Abuse of a Dominant Position in Online Marketplaces and Logistic Services,
April 16, 2019 <https://en.agcm.it/en/media/press-releases/2019/4/Amazon-investigation-
launched-on-possible-abuse-of-a-dominant-position-in-online-marketplaces-and-logistic-
services> accessed 15 November 2019; Competition Authority of Luxembourg opens Platform
Investigation, April 2, 2019 <https://concurrence.public.lu/dam-assets/fr/actualites/2019/2019-
4-1-Communique-services-en-ligne-.pdf> accessed 15 November 2019.
2 Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, When Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at
Search Engines, 18 Yale Journal of Law and Technology, 70 (2016); Maurice E. Stucke & Allen
Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy (OUP, 2016); D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin E. Comerford,
Antitrust and Regulating Big Data, 23 George Mason Law Review, 1129, at 1142 (2016); Ioannis
Lianos & Evgenia Motchenkova, Market Dominance and Search Quality in the Search Engine
Market, 9 Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 419 (2013).












































































502 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
adjacent markets under Article 102 TFEU.4 Particularly since the issuance of
the Commission’s Guidance Paper on abusive exclusionary conduct (‘Guid-
ance Paper’), prohibition of such behaviour is viewed as justified only when
a) dealing with the integrated firm is ‘objectively necessary’ for rivals to
compete effectively in the neighbouring market and b) the dominant company
benefits from a competitive advantage that it has been granted by the State
(for example, through the acquisition of exclusive rights or subsidies).5 Any
application of a lower threshold would seem to require a persuasive rationale
for increased intervention. Yet the Commission itself dispensed with the strict
criteria laid down in its Guidance Paper in Google Search (Shopping), without
putting forward an explicit justification for endorsing a different substantive
legal standard. This article seeks to explore that missing justification by
uncovering the circumstances the Commission might have contemplated.
To this end, the article reviews a central issue that concerns an increasing
number of competition investigations in digital markets: how should the law
address product quality deteriorations when consumers have plenty of choices,
and when disruption, market entry, and growth are close at hand? After all,
where products or services are supplied at zero cost, quality represents an
indispensable facet of competition so that any deterioration in the service’s
performance can be just as injurious to consumers as an increase in price in
remunerated markets.6
At first glance, there are two different, yet similarly acceptable, responses
to that issue. On the one hand, one might contend that information-driven
online markets will inescapably correct themselves. The basic theory is that if
people have choices and there are better substitutes, they simply head for the
alternative. As a platform’s user numbers on the free side of the market drop,
revenue on the advertising side declines, so that the firm is compelled to look
for a course and method that will correct the errors that have led consumers to
4 Ibid., paras 644–652; see, for example, Ioannis Kokkoris, The Google Saga: Episode I, 14
European Competition Journal, 462 (2018); John T. Lang, Comparing Microsoft and Google:
The Concept of Exclusionary Abuse, 39 World Competition, 5 (2016); Eduardo A. Valdivia,
The Scope of the ‘Special Responsibility’ upon Vertically Integrated Dominant Firms after the
Google Shopping Case: Is There a Duty to Treat Rivals Equally and Refrain from Favouring
Own Related Business?, 41World Competition, 43 (2018).
5 Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty
to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, OJ 24 February 2009, C 45/7,
paras 81–82.
6 OECD, Quality Considerations in Digital Zero-Price Markets, (2018); Maurice E. Stucke, Should
We Be Concerned About Data-Opolies?, 2 Georgetown Law Technology Review, 275 (2018); Ariel
Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, The Curious Case of Competition and Quality, 3 Journal of
Antitrust Enforcement, 227 (2015); Nils-Peter Schepp & Achim Wambach, On Big Data and Its
Relevance for Market Power Assessment, 7 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 120
(2015);Cédric Argenton & Jens Prüfer, Search Engine CompetitionWith Network Externalities,












































































Advancing Quality Competition in Big Data Markets 503
move on.7 This is the image associated with the market as a wholly competitive
arrangement where adjustments in the wealth of firms are completely the
result of fundamental changes or relative improvements. Any decline in the
performance of one firm is countered by an increase in the performance of
another so that overall resources will be allocated more efficiently.8 On the
other hand, in concentrated marketplaces, a decline in a firm’s performance
may be wasteful, and this threat is sometimes best addressed and remedied
by the law.9 Competition policy has paid less attention to deteriorations in
product quality, however, specifically when large platforms compete with one
another and quality degradations are brought about by idiosyncratic aspects
of the market which are mutable and which fail to cause enduring, harmful
swings in cost and market structure.10
Precisely this issue lies at the heart of Albert Hirschman’s well-known
work on Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Hirschman’s question is: how can quality
degradations in firms be forestalled? Although long neglected, the concerns
surrounding quality degradations in search engine markets correspond well
with Hirschman’s notorious classification between exit and voice. Exit is
the kind of device that the greater part of economic theory and modern
competition policy are built upon. As Hirschman puts it: ‘The customer who,
dissatisfied with the product of one firm, shifts to that of another, uses the
market to defend his welfare or to improve his position; and he also sets in
motion market forces which may induce recovery on the part of the firm
that has declined in comparative performance’.11 Voice, on the other hand,
is the counterpart of exit: ‘[I]t implies articulation of one’s critical opinions
rather than a private, “secret” vote in the anonymity of [the market]; [it] is
direct and straightforward rather than roundabout’.12 Voice, as opposed to
exit, implicates expression of the customer’s disappointment to the firm so
that the firm takes part in an assessment of the basis of and possible remedies
for the customer’s dissatisfaction.13
7 For an overview see Greg Sivinski, Alex Okuliar & Lars Kjolbye, Is Big Data a Big Deal? A
Competition Law Approach to Big Data, 13 European Competition Journal, 199 (2017);Michael
A. Salinger & Robert J. Levinson, Economics and the FTC’s Google Investigation, 46 Review of
Industrial Organization, 25 (2015).
8 Catherine Tucker, The Implications of Improved Attribution and Measurability for Antitrust
and Privacy in Online Advertising Markets, 20 George Mason Law Review, 1025 (2013); Mark
Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND Journal of Economics, 668 (2006).
9 A.Michael Spence,Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 Bell Journal of Economics, 417 (1975).
10 Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Consumer Protection, and The
Right [Approach] to Privacy, 80 Antitrust Law Journal, 121 (2015); Nathan Newman, Search,
Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data, 31 Yale Journal on Regulation, 401
(2014).
11 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and
States (HUP, 1970), at 15.
12 Ibid., at 16.












































































504 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
Competition law has for the most part worked to emphasize the consumer’s
exit option, and the legal treatment of search engine markets is no exception.
In a particularly vivid illustration of this stance, two prominent commenta-
tors noted that ‘consumers can always switch to substitute search engines
instantaneously and at zero cost’,14 which ‘constrains [search engines’] ability
and incentive to [take] anticompetitive [action]’.15 Consumers ‘can navigate
directly to websites due to the [Internet’s] open architecture’,16 and ‘there are
numerous search engines on the Internet, [so that users] can – and frequently
do – switch among search engines’.17 According to the predominant view, if
a quality degradation occurs, consumers have the opportunity to switch to a
different segment—they may exit the market—and inferior market actors will
lose customers while competitors with superior offers will attract them. Com-
petition law commentary therefore overwhelmingly accepts endorsement of a
high threshold for legal intervention when vertical discriminatory conduct by a
dominant company is to be assessed.18 Furthermore, if market concentration
is high and quality competition deteriorates as a result, breakups or structural
remedies that aim to support the availability of exit are endorsed as the
‘cleanest way’ to realign an industry’s incentives to accommodate consumers’
wants successfully.19
Despite this emphasis on exit, competition law also incorporates voice—
a less-well-ordered notion of consumer influence—which gives rise to distinct
levels of assistance, all the way from enabling consumers to ‘choose differently’
to their ability to ‘directly initiate adjustment’ in the firm’s terms and condi-
tions of agreement.20 ‘Choosing differently’ commands competition agencies
and courts to help put in place a market structure that permits consumers
to acquire their favoured goods from distinct vendors, in distinct purchasing
14 Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, What Does The Chicago School Teach About Internet
Search and The Antitrust Treatment of Google?, 8 Journal of Competition Law & Economics,
663, at 665 (2012).
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., at 669.
17 Ibid.
18 See Giuseppe Colangelo & Mariateresa Maggiolino, Data Protection in Attention Markets:
Protecting Privacy through Competition?, 8 Journal of European Competition Law & Prac-
tice, 363 (2017); Renato Nazzini, Google and the (Ever-stretching) Boundaries of Arti-
cle 102 TFEU, 6 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 301 (2015); Pablo I.
Colomo, Exclusionary Discrimination Under Article 102 TFEU, 51 Common Market Law
Review, 141 (2014); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Prin-
ciple Imperiled? (2019) <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2987&
context=faculty_scholarship> accessed 15 November 2019; Lang, op. cit. supra note 4.
19 A comprehensive overview is provided by Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness. Antitrust in the New
Gilded Age (Columbia Global Reports, 2018).
20 Adrian Kuenzler,Restoring Consumer Sovereignty.How Markets Manipulate Us and What the Law












































































Advancing Quality Competition in Big Data Markets 505
contexts, and at distinct terms and conditions of sale (voice).21 ‘Direct
consumer influence’ involves some features of the case law on abusive practices
of a dominant company which bestow upon consumers the ability to helpmove
the firm’s burden of inertia to adjust terms and conditions of agreement, and
to produce a decision with some precedential weight on a configuration of
the product’s design that consumers truly desire (voice).22 With this range of
possibilities in mind, voice is a less straightforward concept than exit and can
produce distinct adjustments on the part of the firm, depending on what con-
sumers request. Most crucially, it addresses the issue of how an undertaking
can discern and correct its lapses and return to its previous quality standards.
Voice is thus increasingly important in concentrated marketplaces where there
is no price and where quality considerations are predominant. This article
submits that the Commission’s condemnation of a dominant search engine’s
preferential treatment of its own related services is a key instance of users being
given an opportunity to express their views towards the firm, albeit indirectly
through administrative practice, so as to help the declining company to recover.
Rather than relying on prospective shifts of relative advantage caused by users
who are supposed to cease consuming the dominant undertaking’s product,
the Commission’s findings articulate consumer dissatisfaction through an
authority to which the firm’s administration is subordinate or is compelled
to listen. But the constructive opportunities linked with the market’s voice
option and the ability of consumers to exercise agency in their persisting
argument with the firm are the real benefits of voice, benefits which are
overlooked when exit is supposed to be the sole avenue for consumers to
follow.23 This article accounts for the limited ability of exit to restore quality
in data-driven marketplaces. It makes the point that whereas exit is the most
important avenue for competition law to pursue in ordinary circumstances,
voice is essential in helping quality competition to prevail. So far, the discussion
around vertical discriminatory abuses has not been framed in terms of exit and
voice. However, if Hirschman’s categories are borne in mind, it becomes plain
that quality degradations may best be addressed by tweaking the balance of
institutional incentives so as to underpin voice in place of exit.
21 By this it is meant that the extent to which competition law is enforced consumers may be
motivated to choose differently in different market settings, see Adrian Kuenzler, Competition
Law Enforcement on Digital Markets—Lessons from Recent EU Case Law, Journal of Antitrust
Enforcement (2019). However, it is generally the role of regulation rather than competition law
to structure markets with a view to securing a particular outcome for society, Niamh Dunne,
Competition Law and Regulation.Making and Managing Markets (CUP, 2018).
22 Ibid.; Adrian Kuenzler, Direct Consumer Influence—The Missing Strategy to Integrate Data
Privacy Preferences into the Market (2019) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3395928> accessed 15 November 2019.
23 Hirschman, op. cit. supra note 11, at 2. This does not presuppose that consumers speak with
one voice that can be discerned and then represented through administrative practice. Rather,
voice stands for the creation of effective avenues for consumers to intimate opposition with the












































































506 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
The article is arranged as follows. Part II explicates the facts lying beneath
the Commission’s investigation, summarizes the Commission’s decision,
and highlights the main ideas presented in this article. Part III describes
Hirschman’s notion of exit and voice and explains how that notion relates
to the workings of digital markets. Part IV looks at the available case law
on vertical discriminatory abuses. It situates Google Search (Shopping) within
that case law and suggests the ways in which the Commission’s view of self-
favouring is better explained not by a theory of exit but as a notion based
on voice. Part V turns to one final observation stemming from Hirschman’s
theory, suggesting that the consumer’s loyalty offers an additional reason for
the approach adopted by the Commission. Part VI concludes.
II. THE EU COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATION IN GOOGLE SEARCH
(SHOPPING)
In Google Search (Shopping), the European Commission fined Google e2.42
billion for positioning and displaying its own comparison shopping service
more favourably vis à vis competing comparison shopping services in its own
generic search results. In investigating Google’s market position in general
internet search, the Commission foundGoogle to be dominant throughout the
European Economic Area (EEA), exceeding market shares of 90% in all EEA
countries since 2008, or 2011.24 Between 2002 and 2004,Google launched its
comparison shopping service as a separate product operating as a standalone
website under the brand name ‘Froogle’, subsequently renamed as ‘Google
Product Search’ and later referred to as ‘Google Shopping’. Google Shopping
returns product offerings frommerchant websites in response to users’ queries
to enable users to compare them.25 As Google Shopping performed relatively
poorly in the comparison shopping market and failed to succeed in ranking
highly in Google’s generic search results, Google systematically began giving
prominent placement to Google Shopping so that it appeared above those
services that Google’s generic search algorithm considered most relevant
in response to consumers’ product-related queries. Simultaneously, Google
demoted rival comparison shopping services to lower search entry ranks in
its general search results; consequently, even the most highly placed rival
comparison shopping services appeared on average only on page four or
further down in Google Search. As a matter of fact, Google ceased to subject
its own comparison shopping service to Google’s generic search algorithms,
and competing comparison shopping services were prone to being relegated
in Google’s search results by a dedicated set of rules described as ‘Panda’
algorithm.26
24 Case AT.39740,Google Search (Shopping), paras 271–284.
25 Ibid., paras 26–35.
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Owing to the manner in which consumers use a given platform, Google’s
practice had a significant effect on competition in comparison shopping
markets. In particular, the visibility of search results, including their display,
positioning, and page rank, demonstrably affects a user’s search behaviour.27
According to the Commission’s findings, users are more likely to click on the
first three to five generic search results on the first general search results page
and pay little or no attention to the remaining products.28 Typically, the first
result on the first general search results page receives 34% of all clicks on
average whereas the first result on the second page only receives less than
1% of all clicks.29 Since it is the rank, not the relevance of search results
which attracts most clicks by users,30 and since users have been shown to
trust in the perceived editorial integrity of Google’s generic search results
and in Google’s brand,31 Google’s prominent positioning and display of
its comparison shopping website dramatically increased website traffic in
Google’s own comparison shopping service while severely decreasing traffic
for competitors, thereby diverting click-through rates and revenue from com-
petitors to Google’s services themselves.32 In this manner, Google’s market
dominance as a web search engine caused a substantial shift in internet traffic
that led to significant gains in market share for Google Shopping at the expense
of rivals so that Google’s conduct had ‘the potential to foreclose competing
comparison shopping services . . . [and to] reduce the ability of consumers
to access the most relevant comparison shopping services’.33 Accordingly,
Google was held to have abused its market dominance by failing to subject its
comparison shopping service to the same ranking mechanisms as competing
comparison shopping websites.34 Along with the imposition of a fine, the
Commission ordered Google to apply the same processes and methods to
position and display rival comparison shopping services in Google’s search
27 Ibid., paras 397–398 (‘The main difference between the way that Google’s own comparison
shopping service and competing comparison shopping services are displayed inGoogle’s general
search results pages is that specialized search results fromGoogle’s comparison shopping service
are displayed with richer graphical features, including pictures and dynamic information. Those
richer graphical features lead to higher click-through rates’.).
28 Ibid., paras 455.
29 Ibid., paras 457.
30 Ibid., paras 460, 535.
31 Ibid., paras 312, 546.
32 The Commission made it clear that website traffic stemming from Google Search enables
comparison shopping websites to compete in several ways: to generate revenue, to collect users’
data, to improve the relevance of their own results, to experiment and innovate through learning,
and so forth, ibid., paras 444–451. Furthermore, the Commission found that website traffic
from Google Search cannot effectively be replaced through other sources of internet traffic,
ibid., paras 539–542.
33 Ibid., paras 593–597.












































































508 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
results pages as those which it gives to Google Shopping, leaving it for Google
to propose an effective remedy and to ensure compliance with the decision.35
Google appealed the Commission’s ruling, bringing an action for annulment
before the General Court by which it challenged the Commission’s finding,
alleging, among other things, that Google’s activities were aimed at improving
its own services rather than at diverting internet traffic to Google’s comparison
shopping website and that the contested decision violates the legal standard for
assessing Google’s practice.36
In the sections that follow, this article makes three principal arguments
to explain the Commission’s findings based on Hirschman’s theory, whose
underlying themes need to be clarified upfront. First, in a situation where
the market fails to provide the highest quality possible, voice is a convincing
paradigm to explain and justify a competition agency’s intervention. The Com-
mission’s ruling exemplifies this point. Some commentators understand the
Commission’s proceedings against Google largely as the result of complaints
by firms, not by users of Google’s search function, and even at the level of shap-
ing the appropriate remedy, the ongoing procedure hardly seems to foresee
any involvement by consumers themselves. Convincing as this argument may
be, this article suggests that—as a result of the Commission’s intervention—
competition agencies also give space to the consumer’s actual voice, and some
authors, including Hirschman, have suggested that we might see voice as
working in this way, that is, as voice intermediated by a competition agency or a
court.37 In fact, while complaints by firms might be the predominant concern
of competition agencies in addressing quality degradations in markets where
there is no price, the Commission’s investigation also testifies to a growing
apprehension that the assurance of a high level of quality cannot be left to
consumers’ switching alone. As a result, voice is likely to be put forward when
there is a strong interest in assuring quality rather than allowing products of
widely varying quality to be marketed. If such variability is both inevitable
(because of varying algorithm quality, availability, variety, and veracity of
data) and rejected (because of its calamitous economic or social effects), the
maintenance and improvement of quality in search requires the advancement
35 Ibid., paras 693–755.
36 Case T-612/17, Google and Alphabet v Commission, OJ 2017 C 369/37, 30 October 2017
(judgment pending).
37 Hirschman, op. cit. supra note 11, at 2; Gillian K. Hadfield, Robert Howse & Michael
J. Trebilcock, Information-Based Principles for Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy, 21
Journal of Consumer Policy, 131, at 159 (1998); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, More












































































Advancing Quality Competition in Big Data Markets 509
of voice.38 Consequently, voice must be seen both as a by-product and
a primary effect of the Commission’s condemnation of self-favouring, and
therefore at least as an intermediate way of pushing the search market’s quality
equilibrium to a superior level. Second, looking at the issue from the angle of
voice, doctrinally, the article suggests that there is a parallel line of case law
for finding an abuse that does not require the requested input (for example,
Google Search) to be indispensable, and that voice, in such circumstances,
permits one to justify application of an alternative threshold for finding an
anticompetitive abuse. Employment of such a standard seems warranted
where consumer switching turns out to be ineffective to prevent quality from
deteriorating or where ease of consumer switching will result in further quality
deteriorations. To this extent, the article’s conceptual considerations of why
it matters that competition law may target quality deteriorations based on
voice are intertwined with contentious doctrinal issues that the existing case
law breeds. Third, the article proceeds from the implicit understanding that
a dominant search engine’s preferential treatment of its own related services
may impact on the quality of search. On the conventional view, quality deteri-
orations are merely a possible effect of a dominant undertaking’s exclusionary
conduct. From the vantage point of voice, however, deteriorations in quality
must be seen as a component part of that (exclusionary) conduct.39 Adoption
of this perspective entails several advantages for competition law enforcement
under conditions where there is no price; to begin with, the issue as to how
competition law ought to treat the practice of self-favouring taps into a debate
that has sparked controversy within competition law scholarship over several
decades. The issue is whether the law ought to protect consumers or, rather, to
encourage competition.40 If it were not consumers but competitors who were
complaining about a dominant search engine’s discriminatory behaviour,must
competition agencies also demonstrate consumer harm to be able to condemn
such alleged exclusionary conduct? Viewed from the vantage point of voice, it
becomes plain that to the extent that product quality is affected consumers
are inevitably harmed by a search engine’s self-preferential treatment. What
38 This problem is particularly acute when quality affects the newspaper publishing industry,
see Damien Geradin, Complements and/or Substitutes? The Competitive Dynamics Between News
Publishers and Digital Platforms and What It Means for Competition Policy, TILEC Discussion
Paper 2019-003 (2019) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3338941&
dgcid=ejournal_htmlemail_tilburg:law:economics:center:(tilec):law:economics:research:
paper:series_abstractlink> accessed 15 November 2019.
39 For an overview of the conventional view see John M. Yun, Understanding Google’s Search
Platform and the Implications for Antitrust Analyses, 14 Journal of Competition Law & Eco-
nomics, 311 (2018); Damien Geradin & Dimitrios Katsifis, An EU Competition Law Analysis
of Online Display Advertising in the Programmatic Age, 15 European Competition Journal, 55, at
89–91 (2019); Geradin, op. cit. supra note 38; see also Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of 20 June
2019, OJ 2019 L 186/57, para 2.













































































510 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
is more, the costs initially associated with investigating quality deteriorations
in online markets may ultimately inure to the benefit of the investigated firm
rather than impairing it or benefiting competitors that might not always seem
to deserve such support. Importantly, however, voice stands for the proposition
that the market’s supply ought to be based on consumers’ preferences not
only when firms compete on grounds of price but also when quality is the
main (or even the sole) parameter of competition. Here, the demotion of or
refusal to display links to competitor vertical websites in highly commercial
categories may well add up to conduct that will have lasting negative effects
on the welfare of consumers and the promotion of progress. Specifically, Part
V of this article shows that exit may cause harm to the market as a whole—
beyond the injury inflicted by a firm that lowers the quality of its products—
andmay generate its own negative externalities. Seen from the vantage point of
voice, competition law may reasonably address such externalities, aside from
those consequences brought about by the firm’s exclusionary conduct. To be
sure, it may be difficult to work out what ‘good quality search’ represents.
However, adopting the lens of voice includes the advantage that we may avoid
such definitional predicaments altogether. The notion of product quality is
multifaceted, convoluted, and complex, and distinct quality aspects may be
relevant in every single case.41 Voice, however, simply entails that users can
expect from a dominant search engine that vertical search results are listed
on the basis of a measure (whatever this measure will be) that has been
applied equally to the ranking of competitors’ products. Only on the basis
of such expectations are users able to assume correctly that they have been
given an actual choice between a variety of options that reflect the benefits of
commercial innovation.42
III. THE NOTION OF EXIT AND VOICE PERTAINING TO DIGITAL
MARKETS
In his book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Hirschman deploys the instruments of
political scientists and economists to deepen traditional economic analysis
of how competitive behaviour by firms and organizations can be swayed
through either exit or voice. Hirschman’s fundamental distinction works along
41 See José T. Llanos, A Close Look on Privacy Protection as a Non-Price Parameter of
Competition, European Competition Journal (2019). For instance, poor personalization might
be perceived as a quality issue while poor data privacy could also be conceived as one—these
issues may even be mutually incompatible.
42 The notion of voice plays an obvious role in cases of exploitative abuse. One of Hirschman’s
most notorious examples relates to quality deteriorations in education. If educational quality
drops, the most quality-conscious parents will exit, making the quality of education worse
as the less quality-conscious parents will stay on, and those parents are less likely to voice
concerns. Similarly, if search engine quality drops and the savvier users switch, overall quality
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the following lines: a firm’s customers who sense that there is a quality
deterioration in the firm’s products may renounce their affiliation with the
organization (exit) or make an attempt to communicate criticism, protest, or
request the reinstatement of quality (voice). The possibility for consumers
to exit is characteristic of the customary notion of competition where there
are several offers and consumers have the ability to switch. Exit, under
these circumstances, not only affords consumers freedom of choice but also
represents an avenue of influence. If enough consumers switch, exit is expected
to cause revenue losses to the firm,with the result that this pressure will induce
the company to adjust to lower price or to improve quality. Take a platform
operator that provides search engine services to consumers as an example.
Once the quality of the search engine’s services begins to decline, or if some
users think another search engine is better, users may switch to an alternative
search engine operator. Search engines that suffer the loss of consumers in
this manner are compelled to act in response to the market’s signals or they
will eventually be driven out of business. Exit thereby affords consumers the
proper protection, communicating to the platform an instruction to supply
what users truly desire. Consumers could also employ voice, however, a less
blatant reaction that empowers users to reprimand, to find fault with the
search engine’s defects, and to impel the operator to adjust to deliver the most
pertinent results.43
A. Hirschman’s Notions of Exit and Voice
The notion of voice is particularly helpful when we consider how competition
is thought to produce incentives for firms to address quality first, and to initiate
the firm’s recuperation. To explicate this point, it is important to take note
of two separate but closely interrelated observations that squarely contradict
the conventional paradigm: a) exit as a viable solution for combating quality
deteriorations in firms may go awry in several instances, and b) the availability
of exit may, under some circumstances, lead to further quality deteriorations
through a decline in voice. I will address each observation in turn.
First, exit as a recuperation mechanism may fail to provide an appropriate
market response if a quality deterioration is known instantly to all consumers
in a market so that the quality decline causes the bulk of consumers to switch.
Such switching would result in an instant drop in the faltering firm’s income,
and the firm would be beyond revival.44 Conversely, if the market consists
only of a small number of firms that simply take in one another’s disgruntled
customers, the effect of consumer switching will be cancelled out, and exit
43 Hirschman, op. cit. supra note 11, at 42–43 (contemplating the possibility of voice through
consumer movements and institutions to wield an influence over the firm).
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will no longer provide companies with corresponding market signals.45 What
is more, in concentrated marketplaces, exit may fail to be a workable path
of influence for consumers to express their discontent either because there
are no better options for quality-conscious customers or because there are no
viable substitutes at all.46 The upshot of these observations is that voice—
straightforward efforts to adjust the firm’s actual strategy—may be required to
remedy a decline in the quality of products and services in the market.47
Second, the availability of exit might under some circumstances reduce the
effectiveness of voice by silencing consumers’ complaints. If switching is easy,
those consumers most concerned about quality deteriorations will be the first
to leave the firm. Once the most quality-conscious consumers have left, the
remaining consumers will be those who are heedless of quality and who will
be unlikely to bother to voice, while the consumers who have switched to a
superior alternative will no longer need to voice at all.48 However, once voice is
available as a possible avenue of consumer influence, customers need to have
at least some opportunity to switch—or, if exit is unattainable as an option,
they need to be able to express their views effectively, if at all possible by dint
of the regulator—or else the firm will fail to respond.49 As a matter of course,
a company will cease to care about customers’ complaints if consumers lack
an effective means to express their criticism profitably.
On the whole, these insights demonstrate that in many instances exit may
be unsuccessful in reinstating product quality, so that the market’s most
conventional mechanism—the consumer’s ability to switch—will fail to enable
firms to convalesce. Exit, as Hirschman reveals, may then impart a semblance
of competitive order in which consumers’ switching to a rival’s offers precludes
the market from recuperating.50
B. The Pertinence of Hirschman’s Theory for the Operation of
Digital Markets
The interplay between exit and voice feeds into a tenable account of how
quality deteriorations in search engine markets take place. On the supply
45 Ibid., at 26–29. This does not contradict standard microeconomic theory or entail that
competition based on exit is futile. Rather, Hirschman’s observations point to the possibility
of ‘market failure’ also in terms of situations where exit fails to restore efficiency, that is, where
small departures from the perfectly competitive model afford firms some latitude in varying
quality and there is a mixture of alert and inert customers.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., at 29.
48 Ibid., at 44–46, 59–60.
49 Ibid., at 42–43. This is why, in concentrated markets, competition law ought not solely to focus
on the possibility of exit but also to enable the use of voice.
50 Ibid., at 27. By this is meant the restoration of quality although there may be many alternative
options on the market. The problem is thus not so much the working of competition as a process












































































Advancing Quality Competition in Big Data Markets 513
side, unequal access to data among market actors and the manner in which
multisided business models work may lead to quality deteriorations for users
in web search engines specifically. This is due primarily to the features of
digital marketplaces, where the value of a platform’s data grows significantly
by the volume, variety, and veracity of information collected and the velocity
at which such information is produced, administered, and assessed.51 Search
engine operators that have found ways to access large amounts of user data
in a timely fashion frequently possess a competitive advantage over smaller
rivals even if the latter’s algorithms are better. The former can employ their
data to develop a more proficient set of rules through bigger, more diverse sets
of trial and error, and can in turn produce more pertinent search results.52
In addition, while the main dimension of competition is quality in markets
where goods and services are rendered free of charge, search engine operators
typically generate income by selling users’ data (and advertising space) to
advertisers.53 Here, competitive market forces create incentives for platform
operators to lower quality on the free side of the market below levels that users
desire when doing so will increase a platform’s income on the paid market side
(for example, the sale of an increased amount of user data and information to
advertisers affords a higher profit to the platform butmay simultaneously lower
users’ experiences).54 If a market is composed of heterogeneous platforms
of distinct sizes that offer various degrees of product quality, large platform
operators with high data-processing abilities can generate higher profitmargins
on the advertising side of the market than small platform operators can with
low data-processing abilities.55 Platform operators such as Facebook,Amazon,
and Google have accumulated a vast user base and have developed profitable
technologies that are difficult to replicate.56 As a result of such advancements,
these firms have been capable of spreading out into a broader range of services
in separate markets, which has further enlarged the volume and variety of
the data they collect, stimulating an upsurge in productivity, innovation, and
51 Stucke & Grunes, op. cit. supra note 2, at 15–28; Stucke & Ezrachi, op. cit. supra note 2; Schepp
& Wambach, op. cit. supra note 6, at 122.
52 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big Data:A Revolution That Will Transform How
We Live,Work, and Think (John Murray, 2013).
53 Armstrong, op. cit. supra note 8; Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in
Two-Sided Markets, 4 Journal of the European Economic Association, 990 (2003); Bernard Cail-
laud & Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers,
RAND Journal of Economics, 309 (2003).
54 OECD, The Role and Measurement of Quality in Competition Analysis, (2013);Maurice E. Stucke
& Ariel Ezrachi, op. cit. supra note 2, at 71–77; Lars Wiethaus, Google’s Favouring of Own
Services: Comments from an Economic Perspective, 6 Journal of European Competition Law &
Practice, 506 (2015).
55 Stucke & Grunes, op. cit. supra note 2, at 21–22.
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quality improvement.57 In this manner, the profit margins of large firms can
increase more rapidly from the sale of user data and information to advertisers
than the profit margins of smaller rivals, and this chain of events is set in
motion by the heterogeneity of companies and the features of data-driven
marketplaces, and not necessarily by adjustments within firms.58 As a matter
of fact, a firm’s average profit margin will decline when market concentration
grows, that is, when the market’s quality leaders increasingly compete against
similarly large, data-efficient companies.59 Innovation in a service where the
incumbent firm is highly efficient generates lower income than if rivals are
small and inefficient. And with higher market concentration and declining
profit margins within firms, platforms’ incentives to invest in product quality
will be further deterred. What is more, market leaders that have a bigger,
more diverse user base may generate better-quality search results even if they
intentionally lower quality by a small but significant amount.60 This in turn will
trigger an incentive for all market actors to underinvest in quality, degrading
quality standards across the market.61 On the whole,market leaders have more
to gain from profit maximization than from improving product quality, and
the odds are low that the laggards will ever draw near. Consequently, product
quality will fall and profit maximization increase.62
57 Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara I. Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An Expanded Vision of
Relevant Product Markets, 3 Antitrust Law Journal, 769, at 784 (2010).
58 Ibid.;Wu, op. cit. supra note 19; Galloway, op. cit. supra note 56; Stucke & Grunes, op. cit. supra
note 2; Stucke & Ezrachi, op. cit. supra note 2; Schepp & Wambach, op. cit. supra note 6.
59 Lianos & Motchenkova, op. cit. supra note 2, at 421–423, 427–428.
60 Sokol & Comerford, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1142.
61 Stucke & Ezrachi, op. cit. supra note 2, at 96–97.
62 To be sure, the trade-off between price and quality competition is a question of degree for each
firm’s strategy, and the issue of ‘slack’—the problem that firms that face decreased competitive
pressure tend to aim at no more than satisfactory rather than at the highest possible rate of
production—may well activate some counterforces. Quality leaders might, for instance, decide
to compete among themselves on gaining market share, expanding their customer base, and
gaining access to consumers’ data to escape a race to the bottom in terms of price competition
and declining product margins. But the tendency in data-driven marketplaces may well be the
opposite. As Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web
Search Engine, 56 Computer Networks, 3825, at 3831–3832 (2012) explain: ‘Currently, the
predominant business model for commercial search engines is advertising. The goals of the
advertising business model do not always correspond to providing quality search to users. For
example, in our prototype search engine one of the top results for cellular phone is a study
which explains in great detail the distractions and risk associated with conversing on a cell
phone while driving. This search result came up first because of its high importance as judged
by the PageRank algorithm, an approximation of citation importance on the web. It is clear that
a search engine which was taking money for showing cellular phone ads would have difficulty
justifying the page that our system returned to its paying advertisers. For this type of reason
and historical experience with other media, we expect that advertising funded search engines
will be inherently biased towards the advertisers and away from the needs of the consumers’.
In addition, users may have trouble perceiving quality deteriorations, particularly if they fail to
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On the demand side, data-driven marketplaces may render consumer switch-
ing ineffective if, in response to a drop in quality, the bulk of consumers
switch. Here, the leading firm will lack the opportunity to recuperate if it
instantly loses the volume, variety, and veracity of data necessary to adjust
its algorithms accordingly.63 However, if only some consumers switch, the
drops experienced by large firms in the available volume and variety of data
may be so small that they may fail to perceive the pressure to adjust.64 And
consumer switching inevitably will fail to provide an effective signal to the
firm in relation to its shortcomings if the firm can attract new users at the
same time as existing customers leave.65 In search engine markets, users may
engage in multihoming between platforms, that is, they may simultaneously
run identical queries on different search engines because quality among search
engines may be heterogeneous or some search engines may outperform others
on particular requests.66 But the issue of whether users switch at all also
depends on the availability of better quality substitutes. Under conditions
where markets ‘tip’—where the acquisition of a critical mass of users permits
a platform to dominate until a rival market actor disrupts the status quo
and becomes dominant itself—competitors are unlikely to get hold of better
quality alternatives.67 As two prominent commentators note, ‘[with less scale
and] fewer trials, entrants have fewer opportunities to predict search terms,
observe subsequent errors, and perceive trends (consumers’ search terms
relating to a hot topic). Entrants’ ability to identify sites that consumers prefer
is likely to remain inferior, leaving the entrant at a competitive disadvantage
in attracting consumers and advertisers’.68 As firms accumulate ever more
search data, large search engines inevitably become entrenched as dominant
platforms.69 On the other hand, if exit is easy and within reach, those users
who are most concerned about quality—those whomost value speed, accuracy
of results, relevance, personalization, and other quality attributes—will be the
first to move to a superior alternative.70 Smaller search engines may dedicate
their business to specialized search functions—as is the case with purchase,
entertainment, or travel-specific platforms such as Amazon, Spotify, Netflix,
63 See Hirschman, op. cit. supra note 11, at 22–25.
64 Michael Luca et al., Does Google Content Degrade Google Search? Experimental Evidence,
Harvard Business School Working Paper 16–035 (2015) <http://people.hbs.edu/mluca/
SearchDegradation.pdf> accessed 15 November 2019.
65 See Hirschman, op. cit. supra note 11, at 26.
66 Stucke & Ezrachi, op. cit. supra note 2, at 99–101, 104
67 Ratliff & Rubinfeld, Is There a Market for Organic Search Engine Results and Can Their
Manipulation give Rise to Antitrust Liability?, 3 Journal of Competition Law & Economics,
517 (2014).
68 Stucke & Ezrachi, op. cit. supra note 2, at 83–84.
69 Jones Harbour & Koslov, op. cit. supra note 57.
70 A frequently employed response by Google in relation to allegations that its behaviour was
supposedly anticompetitive was that on the internet competition is just one click away, see












































































516 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
or Orbitz—which are better capable of attending to a particular consumer’s
needs. But if switching by quality-conscious consumers takes place, the market
leader may lose a significant segment of users, along with the valuable feedback
and data of users who might otherwise be in the best position through their
online behaviour to help reverse the search engine’s quality deterioration.71
In these cases—be it the loss of a market’s quality leader or the prolonged
experimentation of consumers with alternative options, all operating at lower
quality levels—exit keeps consumers from complaining profitably. It directs
their effort to the hunting for the nonexistent high-quality products that exit
competition was assumed to create. The upshot is that voice—not exit—
may play an important part in unsettling this self-sustaining cycle in which
dominant platform operators are incentivized to invest more in maximizing
profits and to crush ever-dwindling quality competition in their industry, a
hypothesis that Hirschman’s work contributes a great deal towards elucidating.
However, since we naturally conceive of markets in terms of facilitating
exit rather than promoting voice, competition law commentary has generally
emphasized the consumer’s ability to switch in data-driven marketplaces.
Nevertheless, when switching is impracticable or ineffective, recovery on the
part of the firm whose performance has deteriorated is best helped by voice—
by affording agency to consumers through intensified administrative action.72
The Commission’s condemnation of self-favouring may well rest on such a
rationale, but competition law commentary has for the most part criticized
such condemnations for being at odds with the existing case law’s legal stan-
dards. Against the backdrop of Hirschman’s notorious distinction, we are in a
71 See Hirschman, op. cit. supra note 11, at 47–49.
72 Voice can take a number of forms; resort to voice typically assumes the form of a firm’s
customers spending time and effort to marshal some influence or bargaining power on the
firm with whose products they are dissatisfied. Wielding power in this manner (in isolation
or by way of collective action) is easier in markets with few customers than with many, and
customers will be more likely to exert voice if they are wedged with expensive durable goods
that disappoint them than with inexpensive, nondurable goods. Here, the establishment of
consumer research organizations may for instance help consumers make their voices heard.
But voice, once it has been recognized as a useful mechanism for keeping up the market’s
performance, may also take the form of institutional channels of communication for (groups of)
consumers to express their dissatisfaction when they experience difficulty in doing so. Intensified
administrative action by competition agencies is a response to this emergence of the consumer’s
voice when exit can no longer solve most of the ‘sovereign’ consumer’s problems.While it is the
competition agency that will investigate the outcomes of the company’s conduct on consumer
welfare, the primary effect of such consumer influence then is to improve product quality when
consumer switching is unavailable or ineffective. To ensure that an agency’s activities are carried
out on behalf of consumers, competition agencies may ask a sample of customers what they
desire, as competition authorities do when they run the so-called ‘market test’ with respect to
commitments under Article 9 Regulation (EU) 1/2003 of 16 September 2002, OJ 2003 L1/1.
The value for consumers to exercise voice in this manner can be determined by its worth in
maintaining quality when the consumer’s voice has been thwarted due to the increased cost of
individual and collective action or, conversely, as a result of the anticipated rewards for successful












































































Advancing Quality Competition in Big Data Markets 517
better position to evaluate such conduct, since integrating quality competition
into digital markets requires the law to hold platforms accountable to their
users’ calls rather than merely to facilitate their ability to desert.
IV. THE AVAILABLE CASE LAW ON VERTICAL DISCRIMINATORY ABUSES
Once we recognize that voice stands for a constructive avenue of consumer
influence, the issue is how the law defines the conditions under which vertical
discriminatory behaviour amounts to an abuse. So far, competition law has
not been cast as a device to restore quality. In particular, the Commission’s
decision in Google Search (Shopping) has been construed as providing a ‘level
playing field’ in which firms can compete;73 as imposing a ‘duty of equal
treatment’ on vertically integrated dominant firms not to discriminate against
competitors in neighbouring markets;74 or as establishing a requirement of
‘search neutrality’ for internet platforms towards their users.75 As a matter of
practice, the risk of competition law liability must still be seen as an incentive
for market actors to improve quality, but that prospect has not typically been
associated with competition law’s principal goals.Nevertheless, the law against
exclusionary discriminatory conduct must be part of a broader assessment that
concerns themain features of the relevant business strategy.When competition
law performs its function of ensuring fair and free competition and protecting
the welfare and interests of consumers by prohibiting and preventing abuse of
dominant positions or market power, additional benefits inure to the larger
market context within which competition law operates. These benefits do
not necessarily consist in creating a level playing field, equal treatment, or
search neutrality to the extent that competition law commentary has typically
stressed. Instead, they suggest more subtle advantages of desirability, choice,
and the encouragement of the consumer’s preferred options. Hence, when
a general duty not to discriminate, or search neutrality, cannot be put into
effect, competition law enforcement may nevertheless help to improve quality
as a main parameter of competition, given that price is no longer important.76
Conversely, even when a duty of equal treatment or search neutrality is viewed
as exceptionally appropriate under a particular set of circumstances, some
acknowledgment of how the interplay between exit and voice involves quality
ought to be given precedence in order for it to work as a check on unwarranted
government interventions.77 In short, the Commission’s condemnation of self-
73 See Colomo, op. cit. supra note 18, at 154.
74 See Valdivia, op. cit. supra note 4, at 43–44.
75 See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 Cornell Law Review, 1149 (2008).
76 Ezrachi & Stucke, op. cit. supra note 6.
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favouring does rest on a sound rationale but it may not be the one that is usually
presupposed.
A. The Commission’s Theory of Abuse in Relation to Self-Favouring
To appreciate the impact of the Commission’s view with respect to a dominant
search engine’s vertical discriminatory abuse, one must first understand how
competition agencies and courts determine such infringement. In classifying
the nature of the practice of self-favouring, commentators have called for
a resort to courts to determine benchmark notions of accountability for
discriminatory conduct that may cause anticompetitive harm.Most observers
seek to place such conduct into a category best dealt with through circum-
stances in which so called ‘leveraging’—the method whereby a firm employs
its dominant position in one market to perpetrate an abuse in a distinct, but
directly associated, market—amounts to an anticompetitive injury.78 Lever-
aging covers an extensive array of activities that may be viewed as neither
harmful nor as beneficial in themselves.79 Efforts to establish a clear liability
threshold for leveraging abuses have thus drawn on a rich body of case law and
legal literature to evaluate the forms in which such conduct manifests. This
literature reveals that only the most severe types of discrimination fit securely
in clearly established legal liability thresholds while at the same time there is a
need to scrutinize the subtler types on a case-by-case basis.
To begin with, commentators have differed in their views as to whether
vertical discriminatory conduct by a dominant company may be classified as
a refusal to deal, a margin squeeze, or a tying practice.80 Attempts to find an
apt categorization for such practices are complicated by the fact that vertical
discriminatory conduct may be based on price or non-price strategies—such as
when the dominant vendor demands a higher price from competing merchants
than from its own integrated business81 or when it affords its private label
brand a higher visibility on its shelves than those of rival manufacturers82—and
are bound to vary with respect to the conduct’s gravity—for example, where
the merchant refuses to sell competitors’ goods at all, or agrees to sell them,
but at the same time reduces their availability.83 Consider first the available
case law in the European Union with respect to refusals by a dominant
78 See only Andrea Amelio et al., Recent Developments at DG Competition: 2017/2018, 4 Review
of Industrial Organization, 653 (2018); Stefan Holzweber, Tying and Bundling in the Digital Era,
14 European Competition Journal, 342 (2018).
79 Robert O’Donoghue & Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU (Hart, 2013),
at 250–262.
80 See Pinar Akman, The Theory of Abuse in Google Search: A Positive and Normative
Assessment Under EU Competition Law, 2 Journal of Technology Law & Policy, 301 (2016).
81 For an overview see Richard Wish & David Bailey, Competition Law (OUP, 2018), at 732.
82 Ibid., at 697.












































































Advancing Quality Competition in Big Data Markets 519
company to deal with its competitors, an extreme form of discrimination
that results in third parties not being supplied or supplies being halted. The
available case law suggests that behaviour by a dominant firm that amounts
to a refusal to start dealing with a competitor constitutes an anticompetitive
abuse only if doing business with the dominant company is indispensable
at a minimum to carry out trade in the adjacent market in which the third
party requiring access operates.84 Such a high threshold for intervention
limits the scope for refusals to deal with a competitor to a restricted set of
conditions under which such behaviour is considered unlawful. After all, a
dominant company has no general obligation to transact business with its
rivals.Any such obligation would contradict entrenched precepts of freedom of
contract and private property, including a dominant undertaking’s incentives
to invest and innovate.85 However, the law does not impose the requirement
that dealing with a dominant company be indispensable if such a company
terminates a pre-existing relationship with a rival, that is, where a firm simply
ceases to deal with an existing customer. For such conduct to amount to an
abuse, it is sufficient that it ‘risks eliminating all competition on the part
of this customer’,86 that is, if it establishes the likelihood of ‘eliminat[ing] a
trading party from the relevant market’.87 Commentators have argued that
preferential treatment by a dominant search engine of its own related services
that directs search traffic (and thus revenue) away from competitors and
towards the search engine’s own related offers cannot be considered a refusal
to supply an input to a pre-existing customer since arguably there is no trading
relationship between the search engine and any other website where users
obtain information in response to their queries.88 The consequence of this
84 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG, [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, paras 45–46.
Refusals to supply intellectual property rights require an exceptionally high threshold, see Joined
Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television
Publications ltd (ITP) (‘Magill’), [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:98, paras 54–56 (requiring the
prevention of the appearance of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand
and the elimination of all competition on the secondary market); Case C-418/01, IMS Health
GmbH & Co. OHG, [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, paras 28–30, 38; but see Case T-201/04,
Microsoft Corp., [2007] ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, para 229, 647–653 (requiring the hindrance
of the maintenance of effective competition and the discouragement of competitors from
developing new innovations).
85 Lang, op. cit. supra note 4, at 15–18; Nazzini, op. cit. supra note 18, at 308–309.
86 Joined Cases 6 and 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A and Commercial Solvents Corpora-
tion, [1974], ECLI:EU:C:1974:18, para 25.
87 Case C-27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal B.V., [1978],
ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, para 183.
88 Akman, op. cit. supra note 80, at 355; Nazzini, op. cit. supra note 18, at 307 (adding that this
must hold particularly if the dominant search engine displays its rival’s services in its own search
results without omitting them altogether); similarly Marina Lao, Search, Essential Facilities, and
the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 11 Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, 275,
at 278 (2013); Torsten Körber, Common Errors Regarding Search Engine Regulation—And How
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view is that indispensability is required for a competition authority to condemn
a dominant search engine’s preferential treatment of its own related services.
Attention has also been turned to another form of abuse whereby a vertically
integrated firm harms its rivals by charging prices in the upstream and/or
downstream market that preclude downstream competitors from carrying on
business profitably.89 An example of this practice, typically labelled ‘margin
squeeze’, is a pricing policy applied by a telephone network owner under which
the spread between its sale prices for broadband connection services to end
users and the prices charged to competitors for access to the network itself does
not allow competitors to cover the costs that the network operator had to incur
to distribute those services to end users.90 Some commentators have argued
that this practice essentially adds up to a (‘constructive’) refusal to deal in that
the offer by the dominant firm is of such a nature that the supplier understands
it to be unacceptable, unreasonable, or unduly delaying.91 Looking at margin
squeeze law in this way would entail that an abuse ensues only if access
to the wholesale product is indispensable for the sale of the retail product
precisely because such conduct, in effect, represents an outright refusal to
deal.92 However, the CJEU (Court of Justice of the European Union) has
defined margin squeeze by a dominant undertaking as simply ‘[being] capable
of having anti-competitive effects on themarkets concerned’.93 Doing business
with the vertically integrated firm, therefore, does not need to be indispensable
for competitors in the dominant company’s downstream market. Rather, it
is sufficient for a competition authority or court to establish that a margin
squeeze at least has a potentially harmful effect.94 Although internet search
engines usually charge competitors a flat fee for being listed in their generic
89 See above all Friso Bostoen, Online Platforms and Vertical Integration: The Return of Margin
Squeeze?, 6 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 355 (2018); Akman, op. cit. supra note 80, at
323–325.
90 Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, [2011], ECLI:EU:C:2011:83, paras
4–8, 32.
91 See Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law (OUP, 2016), at 496; see also Guidance
Paper, op. cit. supra note 5, paras 79.
92 But see Dennis W. Carlton, Should ‘Price Squeeze’ Be a Recognized Form of Anticompetitive
Conduct?, 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 271 (2008); J. Gregory Sidak, Abolishing
the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 Journal of Competition Law & Economics,
279 (2008).
93 Case C-52/09, TeliaSonera, para 72.
94 See also Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay, The EU Law of Competition (OUP, 2014), at 480–489;
O’Donoghue & Padilla, op. cit. supra note 79, at 399–403; Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-
Farrar & Nicolas Petit, EU Competition Law and Economics (OUP, 2012), at 250–269. One view
explains this approach to margin squeeze cases to the extent that issues related to collective
dominance (for example, two possible networks to which the new player could gain access to the
downstream market) are affected. In Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89, SIV , [1992],
ECLI:EU:T:1992:38, para 28, the Court of First Instance stated that ‘participants in a tight
oligopoly [ . . . ] enjoy a degree of independence from competitive pressures that enables them
to impede the maintenance of effective competition, notably by not having to take account of












































































Advancing Quality Competition in Big Data Markets 521
search results, as well as a variable fee payable on every occasion a user
clicks through to the dealer’s website,95 most scholars of competition law have
emphasized the ways in which search algorithms are biased in favour of the
dominant company’s own and against competitors’ downstream services.96
Preferential treatment of a search engine’s own related business, according
to this view, is to be understood as an instance of discrimination to be found
in ‘applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage’ (Article 102 lit.
c TFEU) rather than as an application of different price conditions to the
dominant company’s downstream customers.97
But application of the general prohibition of Article 102 lit. c TFEU on
discriminating against competitors in adjacent markets would give rise to an
altogether different legal standard, triggered by the dominant company’s exclu-
sionary intent rather than by evidence of anticompetitive foreclosure.98 If such
an intent can be established, the firm’s application of less favourable terms and
conditions to competitors must presumably be perceived as anticompetitive
unless the dominant company can present an objective justification for the
favouring of its own business.99 Early theorists thought this standard appro-
priate for assessing a dominant search engine’s favouring of its own related
services, and considered the rules set out by the CJEU for the evaluation
of tying, which essentially follow the same framework as those applicable to
vertical discriminatory conduct.100 Yet in the interim, some consensus has
emerged that Article 102 lit. c TFEU cannot represent the proper scope of
analysis for such behaviour, for the wording of the Article necessitates that the
discrimination ensue not merely between the dominant firm and its customers
but among ‘other trading parties’ and no one else.101
This survey demonstrates that any attempt to classify a dominant search
engine’s favouring of its own related services into pre-existing legal cate-
95 Case AT.39740,Google Search (Shopping), para 168; Bostoen, op. cit. supra note 89, at 372–373.
96 See Chiara Fumagalli, Massimo Motta & Claudio Calcagno, Exclusionary Practices (CUP,
2018), at 604–610.
97 See Case C-525/16, MEO, [2018], ECLI:EU:C:2018:270; Valdivia, op. cit. supra note 4, at
59–62.
98 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG, [1979], ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, paras 90–91; Case
T-228/97, Irish Sugar PLC, [1999], ECLI:EU:T:1999:246, paras 179–180; Joined Cases
C-395/96 P and 396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Belge SA and Dafra-Lines A/S, [2000],
ECLI:EU:C:2000:132, para 119.
99 Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV , [1991], ECLI:EU:C:1991:286, paras 140, 146.
100 Benjamin Edelman, Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling?, 11
Journal of Competition Law& Economics, 365 (2015); Akman, op. cit. supra note 80, at 344–355.
101 Nazzini, op. cit. supra note 18, at 307–308;Damien Geradin & Nicolas Petit, Price Discrimina-
tion under ECCompetition Law:Another Antitrust Doctrine in Search of Limiting Principles?,
2 Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 479 (2006); however, there is well-established
case law that applies Article 102 lit. c TFEU to vertical discrimination cases, see Case 6/72,
Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc., [1973], ECLI:EU:C:1973:22
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gories converges such behaviour into a complex amalgam of refusal to deal,
margin squeeze, or tying practice. The fact-specific nature of such conduct
affords an inadequate epistemic fit for pre-existing legal categories. Most
commentators therefore agree that deployment of self-promoting algorithms
that divert the visibility of search results (including their display, positioning,
and page rank) and internet traffic away from competitors and towards the
dominant company’s own related products constitutes a sui generis abuse.102
Any determination of the legal relevance threshold under Article 102 TFEU
to be applied to such behaviour must then be made not on nominalist
but on substantive grounds. However, the view has also emerged that in
making this determination, indispensability ought to apply.103 For one thing,
competition law would otherwise inflict upon a dominant platform a positive
duty to act on behalf of its rivals. Prescription of the manner in which
dominant platforms display and rank their search results, even if such visibility
has a demonstrable impact on users’ behaviour,104 is seen as an undue
interference in a dominant undertaking’s commercial freedom that deters
investment incentives and enables competitors to gain access to the dominant
company’s facility without contributing to the advancement of the resource in
the first place.105 Moreover, commentators who support deployment of the
high indispensability threshold for assessing a search engine’s self-promoting
algorithms follow an approach that implicates an argument of consistency.
The idea is that for reasons of predictability, a cohesive baseline ought to
apply to all discriminatory conduct, particularly under circumstances where
different formal embodiments manifest as an essentially equivalent type of
behaviour.106 Although the available case law authorizes a lower baseline
standard for administrative action in margin squeeze cases, the condemnation
of margin squeeze is still viewed as based on a requirement of indispensability,
inflicted, however, by some regulatory or factual circumstances. For instance,
industry sectors involving infrastructure that is very expensive to reproduce
and in which it is essential for competitors to transact business with the
holder of this infrastructure (as in liberalized network industries involving
energy, telecommunications, or postal services) may limit considerably the
growth of effective competition. The Commission appears to consider this
especially likely where regulation already imposes an obligation to supply
102 See only Romano Subiotto, David R. Little & Romi Lepetska, The Application of Article
102 TFEU by the European Commission and the European Courts, 9 Journal of European
Competition Law & Practice, 476, at 479 (2018); Thomas Hoppner, Felicitas Schaper & Philipp
Westerhoff,Google Search (Shopping) as a Precedent for Disintermediation in Other Sectors—
The Example of Google for Jobs, 9 Journal of European Competition Law& Practice, 627 (2018).
103 See Colomo, op. cit. supra note 18, at 153; Nazzini, op. cit. supra note 18, at 309.
104 Case AT.39740,Google Search (Shopping), paras 454–476.
105 Lang, op. cit. supra note 4, at 15–16, 22–23; Colomo, op. cit. supra note 18, at 154; Nazzini,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 308; Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG, [1998], Opinion
of A.G. Jacobs, ECLI:EU:C:1998:264, paras 56–57.












































































Advancing Quality Competition in Big Data Markets 523
on the dominant undertaking and where the undertaking has acquired or
developed the resource with the assistance of the State.107 Indeed, most
cases where indispensability was not explicitly required may fit into such
a framework. Deutsche Telekom,108 TeliaSonera,109 and Telefónica110 involved
operations in the telecommunications sector; Deutsche Post111 and Deutsche
Bahn112 concerned postal and railway infrastructure; and other proceedings
referred to the gas transmission market.113 Imposing indispensability (explicit
or implied) as a requirement for all vertical discrimination cases is thus seen
to be consistent with the notion that competition law may force undertakings
to deal on equal terms with their competitors only under extraordinary
circumstances.
B. The Benefits of Voice for Assessing Vertical Discriminatory
Abuses
As a result of such principled attempts to fit the existing patchwork of adminis-
trative practice into a coherent framework that permits normative clarification
and consolidation, there is considerable doubt as to whether a dominant
search engine’s preferential treatment of its own related services could validate
administrative action according to Article 102 TFEU under circumstances
where transacting business with an integrated company may have a purely
exclusionary effect or may put rivals at a competitive disadvantage (and thus
is not indispensable as set forth by the case law on refusals to deal). But
the Commission’s decision in Google Search (Shopping) does precisely that—
it authorizes agency intervention under conditions that dispense with the
requirement that being listed in a nondiscriminatory manner is ‘objectively
necessary’ for rivals to compete.114 It thereby further obfuscates the com-
monly recognized liability standard according to which vertical discriminatory
conduct is meant to be assessed. At the same time, there is no articulated
rationale for the Commission’s lowering of its legal liability threshold. This
section addresses this gap, appraising, in particular, the legal and economic
consequences of the Commission’s approach to condemning a dominant
search engine’s self-preferential treatment.
107 Guidance Paper, op. cit. supra note 5, para 82.
108 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG, [2010], ECLI:EU:C:2010:603.
109 Case C-52/09, TeliaSonera.
110 Case C-295/12 P,Telefónica SA and Telefónica de España SAU , [2014], ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062.
111 2001/892/EC: Commission Decision of 25 July 2001 relating to a proceeding under Article 82
of the EC Treaty (COMP/C-1/36.915—Deutsche Post AG—Interception of cross-border mail), OJ
2001, L 331/40.
112 Case T-229/94, Deutsche Bahn AG, [1997], ECLI:EU:T:1997:155.
113 COMP/39.402, RWE-Gas Foreclosure Commitments Decision 18 March 2009, [2009] OJ C
133/10, IP/09/410.
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On close examination, the rule expressed by the Commission draws on a
body of case law established by the CJEU that recognizes that an undertaking
with a dominant position in a ‘raw materials market’, which, with the object
of reserving such ‘raw material’ for selling its own ‘derivatives’, abuses its
dominant position in the upstream market by refusing to supply a customer
that itself is a manufacturer of such ‘derivatives’. The gist of the Court’s
argument recurs in every case. In Commercial Solvents, the CJEU stated that
a dominant supplier of aminobutanol that is in a position to control the sub-
stance’s availability to manufacturers of drugs, cannot, just because it decides
to start producing these same drugs in competition with its customers, act in
such a way as to eliminate their stock.115 In Napier Brown – British Sugar, a
dominant purveyor of granulated sugar, which also sold derivative retail sugar,
was found to abuse its dominant position by refusing to supply granulated
sugar to an existing customer and competitor in the retail market.116 Other
cases involved decisions of dominant undertakings refusing to supply spare
parts and services for their products in aftermarkets with a view to carrying out
those services themselves. Hugin concerned a manufacturer of cash registers
refusing to supply spare parts outside of its distribution network.117 Volvo
and Renault addressed refusals by car manufacturers to license intellectual
property rights to independent repairers to protect their own dealers.118 And
IBM Maintenance Services dealt with delayed access and the provision of
unreasonable terms and conditions for the supply of computer spare parts
so as to exclude a dominant hardware manufacturer’s downstream rivals.119
As stated by the CJEU in Commercial Solvents, if a transfer of market power
from the primary to the secondary market occurs, it does not matter whether
competitors in secondary markets have ‘an urgent need for [the raw material]
or whether [they are able to] reorganize [their] production in good time’.120
That is, the product or service does not need to be objectively necessary for
115 Joined Cases 6 and 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A and Commercial Solvents Corpo-
ration, para 25.
116 88/518/EEC: Commission Decision of 18 July 1988 relating to a proceeding under Article 86
of the EEC Treaty (Case No. IV/30.178Napier Brown – British Sugar), OJ 1988, L 284/41, para
64.
117 Case 22/78,Hugin Kassaregister AB, [1979], ECLI:EU:C:1979:138, paras 15–26.
118 Case C-238/87,AB Volvo, [1988], ECLI:EU:C:1988:477; Case C-53/87,CICRA and Renault,
[1988], ECLI:EU:C:1988:472, para 16 (some commentators argue that these cases are about
narrowly defined aftermarkets so that here, indispensability is implied).
119 Case COMP/C-3/39692—IBMMaintenance Services, 13 December 2011,C(2011) 9245 final.
120 Joined Cases 6 and 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A and Commercial Solvents Corpo-
ration, para 26. However, commentators have inferred from the findings of fact that because
Commercial Solvents was the sole viable supplier of raw materials, in effect, indispensability












































































Advancing Quality Competition in Big Data Markets 525
rivals to be able to compete effectively on a downstream market.121 These
cases do not fit into a coherent framework that may yield clarity around
the precise legal category for exclusionary discrimination to be subject to a
precondition of indispensability. Instead, their nature arguably rests on the
view that indispensability is required solely for outright refusals to deal where
a business relationship has never been established with competitors before so
that there can be no ‘transfer’, or ‘leverage’, of market power in the absence
of a primary market. A dominant search engine’s preferential treatment of its
own related services does not seem to resemble such a situation. It is better
placed within a condition where a dominant company alters its behaviour,
that is, where a dominant company disrupts a previous business relationship
only for the purpose of gaining an anticompetitive advantage in the adjacent
market. Indeed, according to the Commission’s ruling, Google was found to
have changed its algorithms to promote its own related services over those
of its competitors.122 Since there is no established precedent that demands
indispensability for leveraging market power in this manner, the Commission
arguably concluded that Google’s behaviour looked more like the situation
in Commercial Solvents, where a dominant company terminates an existing
business relationship with a customer or subsequently modifies its nature,
rather than a set of circumstances in which the dominant company has not
previously supplied at all.
What is more, some commentators argue that most exclusionary discrim-
ination cases that do not necessitate indispensability may still be viewed
as in line with the jurisprudence and commentary of the CJEU that call
for indispensability, either because the dominant undertaking was the sole
viable supplier of raw materials, or because the respective cases were about
(after)markets that were defined so narrowly that indispensability is implied.
121 This is at least implicit in the Court’s statement that an undertaking being in a position to
control the supply of derivatives cannot, just because it decides to start manufacturing these
derivatives, act in such a way as to eliminate their competition. Particularly, according to the
Court, it does not matter that a) the undertaking ceased to supply because the sale of such
derivatives would have stopped in any case, b) whether the supplied company still had large
quantities of this product which would enable it to reorganize its production in good time, and
that c) the supply of such derivatives would affect the possibilities of producing the products in
question by the supplier itself, ibid., at paras 25–28.
122 Case AT.39740, Google Search (Shopping), paras 358, 443, 467–469. The General Court
in Case T-851/14, Slovak Telekom, [2018], ECLI:EU:T:2018:929, paras 95–129, seems to
reinforce the proposition that indispensability ought not to be required in every refusal-to-deal
scenario when it states that the judgments in Bronner and Commercial Solvents ‘are compatible’,
ibid., at para 99. Particularly, according to the Court, the way in which a ‘refusal to deal’ is used
as a way to bring about a particular restriction of competition matters for the determination
of whether indispensability is a necessary condition for intervention. As a result, the Court
explicitly distinguishes between the sale of an input to competitors on a downstreammarket and
the supply of finished goods for distribution or resale, and whether the dominant undertaking
decides to terminate the supply of goods that it previously supplied to the customers in question
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Here, the Commission’s Guidance Paper provides instructive advice to the
extent that the Commission sets forth the general conception under which
termination of an existing supply arrangement is more likely to be found
abusive than a de novo refusal to supply. For example, the requested input
must automatically be seen as indispensable if the dominant undertaking had
previously been delivering to a competitor and the latter had made specific
investments so as to use the subsequently refused input. Indispensability
is also thought to be fulfilled by the fact that the dominant undertaking
had previously thought it to be in its interest to deal with a competitor
such as when the dominant undertaking’s previous provision of the input
adequately compensated for its original investment.123 As stated above, against
a similar backdrop, the CJEU has stressed that the law on margin squeeze
does not require indispensability explicitly but such law may in fact be seen
as being governed by an implied indispensability precept.124 Commentators
who oppose this view have argued that if a dominant undertaking may lawfully
refuse access to its facility in the first place, it makes no sense to impose upon
an integrated undertaking antitrust liability for granting access at unfavourable
conditions.125 The dominant company could preclude antitrust liability for
such conduct simply by refusing to grant access to the facility at all. But the
CJEU seems to assume that refusal to grant access at unfavourable conditions
does not always implicate the possibility of an outright refusal to deal (‘it
cannot be inferred [ . . . ] that the conditions to be met in order to establish
that a refusal to supply is abusive must necessarily also apply when assessing
the abusive nature of conduct which consists in supplying services or selling
goods on conditions which are disadvantageous’).126 Indeed, condemnation
of a search engine’s preferential treatment of its own related services may
encompass the adverse effects of leveraging in a manner in which simple
scrutiny of outright refusals to deal cannot, particularly when it is unworkable
for a search engine not to list competitor websites in its search results at all
but there are nonetheless conditions that support the dominant undertaking’s
transfer of market power—such as when competitors’ websites are demoted
to lower ranks and their visibility and traffic are decreased—to exclude rivals
from the secondary market.127 Such behaviour may increase the value of the
123 Guidance Paper, op. cit. supra note 5, para 84. In making this statement, the Commission
primarily seems to look at the issue of incentives to invest. However, there is nothing in the
Guidance Paper that prevents one from reading the Commission as not always requiring
indispensability—as this flows naturally from the case law stating that a refusal to deal is an
abuse under exceptional circumstances.
124 Case C-52/09, TeliaSonera, para 72; Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica SA and Telefónica de España
SAU , paras 118–119; Case T-398/07, Kingdom of Spain, [2012], ECLI:EU:T:2012:173, paras
76–78.
125 OECD, Margin Squeeze, (2009), at 8; Nazzini, op. cit. supra note 18, at 309; Jones & Sufrin,
op. cit. supra note 91, at 426–429.
126 Case C-52/09, TeliaSonera, paras 55, 58.












































































Advancing Quality Competition in Big Data Markets 527
dominant platform disproportionately to the detriment of rivals, along with
the volume and variety of user data acquired, and rival platforms could be
successful only if a similar number of users were attracted within a short period
of time. Indispensability may then well be implied, just as if an operator of a
bottleneck in a networked industry has acquired an indispensable resource,
so that access to the input must be deemed objectively necessary to carry
on trade in a neighbouring market.128 Following this line of reasoning, the
Commission arguably could not rule out that a dominant search engine’s
preferential treatment of its own related services would eliminate all effective
competition in the downstream market. As the Commission stated, Google’s
conduct was ‘capable of leading competing comparison shopping services
to cease providing their services’—a circumstance that inevitably must ensue
where the desired resource is (at least implicitly) indispensable.129
Beyond these doctrinal quarrels, the Commission’s analysis of the practice
of self-favouring is probably the most appropriate place to review the appli-
cation of Hirschman’s notion of how quality competition works. What if the
criteria that drove the Commission’s reasoning acknowledged the benefits of
voice set out above—the manner in which consumer influence performs the
identical function as the goal of increasing product quality? At a minimum,
from this vantage point, we would be in a position to provide a more robust
defence for the Commission’s view that intensified administrative action under
Article 102 TFEU is warranted within the meaning of the case law on the
termination of existing supply arrangements when it comes to analysing a
dominant search engine’s self-preferential treatment of its own related services.
In the view of most theorists, the policies implemented by Google could
ultimately not amount to anticompetitive harm, and most of the work on the
issue has scrutinized the practice of self-favouring through the lens of ‘non-
discrimination’. At this juncture, commentators have rightly pointed out that
the creation of an enforced level playing field might induce competitors to
claim nondiscriminatory access to a dominant firm’s products rather than
innovating themselves, and would therefore lead to a reduction in incentives
to compete, to increased transparency, and to the associated likelihood of
collusion, thereby eliminating all the benefits and synergies of vertical inte-
gration.130 Consistent with this view, commentators have further pointed out
that the injury must be located somewhere else, and have speculated as to
whether the practice of self-favouring may consist in a violation of a principle
128 Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye & Heike Schweitzer, Competition Policy for the
Digital Era (Brussels, 2019), at 62–63.
129 Case AT.39740,Google Search (Shopping), paras 593–594 (emphasis added); Guidance Paper,
op. cit. supra note 5, para 81, 83, 85; Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG, paras
40–52; Colomo, op. cit. supra note 18, at 157.












































































528 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
of ‘search neutrality’.131 Recognition of such a principle, however, is heavily
contested as it is the stated purpose of a search engine to select as well as
possible, based on the search terms entered, among the results that best match
users’ needs. The objective of a search engine consists precisely in making a
selection, and there can hardly be an objectively correct result that will be
chosen as a basis for comparison. Search criteria imposed by a competition
authority or court, or even the prescription of what is supposed to be the
correct ‘default’, could scarcely be more ‘neutral’ than the actual criteria
chosen by the search engine itself.132 While the ‘best’ result is always one that
suits users’ preferences to the greatest extent, a search engine can deliver only
one first best result, and search engines constantly have to adapt to improve
their algorithms so as to stay apace with consumers’ desires. The production
of a ‘search bias’, thwarting the capacity of users to obtain their preferred
outcomes, can therefore barely amount to an anticompetitive injury, or else the
manner in which search engines perform must constantly be suspicious.133 A
more useful way to understand the Commission’s treatment of self-favouring
is therefore as an attempt to restore quality, that is—as the Commission remarks
itself—‘to render a possible degradation by [search engines] in the quality of
[their] general search service unprofitable’134 and to repair the ‘incentives of
[search engines] to improve the quality of [their own related services when
they do not] need to compete on the merits with competing . . . services’.135
That notion portrays what both the Commission and Hirschman were aiming
at and aids us to settle the doctrinal puzzle that the practice of self-favouring
breeds.
OnceHirschman’s framework is recalled, it is straightforward to understand
that the authorization of voice through intensified administrative practice
represents an integral part of the Commission’s effort to restore quality. As
suggested previously, in data-driven marketplaces, the availability of likely
alternatives for switching may render it less rather than more probable that
a flaw in a dominant company’s products or services will be rectified rather
than entertained. If users, in response to a quality deterioration, are easily
able to switch, the respective quality deterioration may be sustained more
permanently than if users were given an opportunity to mount pressure on the
firm to modify the product’s design to the extent that quality is re-established.
131 Frank Pasquale,The Black Box Society.The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information
(HUP, 2015).
132 Crane, op. cit. supra note 77; Boris P. Paal, Internet Search Engines and Antitrust Law, 11 JIPLP,
298 (2016); James Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism about Search Neutrality, in Berin Szoka &
Adam Marcus (eds), The Next Digital Decade: Essays on the Future of the Internet (Techfreedom,
2010).
133 Florian Wagner-von Papp, Should Google’s Secret Sauce be Organic?, 16Melbourne Journal of
International Law, 1 (2015).
134 Case AT.39740,Google Search (Shopping), para 313.
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What is more, in data-driven marketplaces, exit by some users may fail to
exhibit its expected effects as the dominant company may not even be in a
position to take note of the fact that some users have switched so long as
the dominant platform commands a sufficient volume and variety of data. On
the other hand, if switching is possible, the most quality-conscious users will
arguably be the first to switch and move to the rival platform that presumably
delivers superior results. But such switching may lead to an even greater
deterioration in quality if the most quality-conscious consumers would have
been those best placed to bring the firm back to a path where it could have
produced a significant upsurge in quality. Unlike with price changes, which
give rise to a change in expenditure for all customers, a quality change may
render the good or service more esteemed by one group of users,whereas other
users might simultaneously come to find the good or service less appealing.136
A platform’s decision to allow quality to deteriorate might therefore either
cause the firm to simultaneously lose and gain some users, or, if few or no
substitutes exist, might cause satisfaction and dissatisfaction in distinct groups
of consumers. It is precisely for that reason that the Commission’s findings
serve to validate the manner in which quality competition is pushed forward
not just through exit, but through intensified administrative practice: by
enabling quality-conscious consumers to stay on for some time and to compel
the dominant company to listen, at the same time reducing users’ discontent
rather than merely enlisting the firm to maximize income.137 To be sure, from
the conventional point of view, the idea that in Google Search (Shopping), the
Commission essentially worked to integrate voice through minimizing users’
lack of approval might seem counterintuitive. But Hirschman’s observations
reveal that voice may be superior to a market arrangement in which only the
possibility of exit prevails and that intensified administrative practice may play
an important part in incorporating quality competition under circumstances
where consumer switching is impracticable or wasteful.138
The depiction of the practice of self-favouring in this manner also enables
us to resolve some of the doctrinal issues the Commission’s findings have
produced.While the Commission’s view towards self-favouring does not seem
to rest on an explicit indispensability precept as does the related strand of
outright refusal-to-deal cases introduced previously, against the backdrop of
Hirschman’s framework it seems entirely reasonable for a competition agency
or a court to apply the same legal liability threshold as has been deployed
in cases involving refusals to cease dealing, or margin squeeze practices,
respectively. Just like in the Commission’s Guidance Paper and a number of
decisions relating to vertically integrated dominant firms in liberalized network
industries whose economic features constrain considerably the capacity of new
136 Hirschman, op. cit. supra note 11, at 48–50.
137 Ibid., at 67–71.
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entrants to replicate them, the incentives to maximize profits and sacrifice
quality that data-driven marketplaces create, as well as the ways in which
such markets render consumer switching ineffective, provide a compelling
rationale for a corresponding baseline standard to apply. If a search engine’s
vertical discriminatory behaviour explicitly required proof of indispensability,
an agency could scarcely intervene and the market’s voice mechanism—helped
by intensified administrative action—would be suppressed.139 The market
would then be left to rely on consumer switching, and quality deteriorations
could not be addressed. On the other hand, if the legal condemnation of self-
favouring truly contained a ‘non-discrimination’ or ‘search neutrality’ rule, a
competition agency or a court would be required to pinpoint a distinct duty
of equal treatment with respect to the particular outcomes users desire. Such
an assessment would necessarily entail a selection between the dissimilar, at
times even incompatible, preference orderings of users.140 The qualification of
self-favouring, however, does not have to rest on such an impracticable (and
perhaps unattainable) condition. Instead, the practice is more straightforward
to grasp when judged against the benefits of voice. Seen from this vantage
point, an agency’s intervention also enables users to express their views in their
enduring fight against the firm’s quality deterioration under circumstances
where exit fails to work. The better way to comprehend the Commission’s
treatment of self-favouring is thus as an effort to clear the channels of consumer
influence rather than as conceptualizing it as a violation of themanner in which
the firm’s product has been designed.
This argument does not suggest that reframing the Commission’s treatment
of self-favouring in this way unequivocally transforms it into practicable legal
doctrine. Commentators have wrestled with the Commission’s adoption of a
distinct legal liability threshold for a long time, and the proposed framework
certainly does not render it less demanding to grasp. Altogether, even if a
competition agency or court recognizes that a deterioration in quality has
taken place, it would still have to engage in exceptionally intricate assessments
about whether the market’s exit mechanism is working properly. However,
the proposed analysis affords one important benefit over other attempts to
rationalize the Commission’s findings. It enables us to see that exit and voice,
long supposed to be contrary to, or at least independent of, one another,
are profoundly significant in the ways in which they interact: that they are
intertwining mechanisms that push the interplay of demand and supply ahead.
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LOYALTY FOR VOICE TO BE EFFECTIVE
The relationship between exit and voice set out so far can be clarified further if
the concept of loyalty is taken into account. Loyalty—a feeling of attachment
139 Kokkoris, op. cit. supra note 4.












































































Advancing Quality Competition in Big Data Markets 531
by a consumer to a firm of which they are a customer—may suspend exit such
as when someone who has always purchased Pepsi will not aspire to buy Coke
even if the former’s recipe has changed. Loyal consumers are more likely to
resort to voice—even if switching is possible—to the extent that they identify
with the product or service and aim to help to improve it.141 Search engine
users who feel strongly about quality adjustments are prone to be those who
feel most fervently about the search engine’s operation itself. Such attachment
to the manufacturer’s product is likely to intensify the firm’s incentive to
repudiate policies that their consumers oppose. A frequent manifestation of
loyalty is brand loyalty, which becomes apparent precisely in the unwillingness
of consumers to switch from one brand to another, even when the available
substitutes are better, cheaper, or within easier reach. This aspect of loyalty is
becoming increasingly essential in data-driven economies as well. Importantly,
the Commission observed in Google Search (Shopping) that ‘because of the
strength of the Google brand, users trust in the relevance of search results
provided by Google. Consequently, [ . . . ] a significant number of users are
unlikely to multi-home even if Google were to degrade the quality of its general
search service’.142 As users’ brand loyalty continues to grow, the switch from
one ecosystem to another will become less likely, with the implication that
consumer influence reduces to voice. This view is clearly reflected in the
Commission’s view towards self-favouring when it remarked; ‘because of the
infrequency of user multi-homing and the existence of brand effects [ . . . ],
Google could alter the quality of its general search service to a certain degree
without running the risk that a substantial fraction of its users would switch to
alternative general search engines’.143 Where customer loyalty is key, quality-
conscious users are less likely to switch. Indeed, they are most likely to stay
on with the deteriorating product or service longer than they otherwise would,
despite the availability of alternative options. The most practicable path for
improving quality, then, is to increase the consumer’s ability to employ voice,
that is, to create effective avenues for consumers to signal their dissatisfaction
with the firm when they are less willing to switch and product quality declines.
Note that this relationship between loyalty and exit suggests that depending
on the legal standard put in place, the consumer’s voice will be more or less
functional. In concentrated marketplaces, the consumer’s voice may be put
to use in a purposeful manner only when voice is rendered available as an
institutional channel for achieving the ends that loyal consumers request.144
Voice is thus most valuable when the law puts in place a mechanism that will
increase the scope and effect of the consumer’s disagreement with the firm,
and so works to bolster the rationale for quality competition to prevail.
141 Hirschman, op. cit. supra note 11, at 76–86 (consumers may exhibit loyal behaviour silently
but Hirschman conceives of loyalty more as an issue of holding exit at bay).
142 Case AT.39740,Google Search (Shopping), para 312.
143 Ibid., para 324.
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Hence, loyal behaviour by the consumer points to an additional benefit
of voice that is frequently neglected when we contemplate only the private
inconveniences the consumer sustains due to their own decision (not) to
switch. Above all, loyal behaviour by the consumer may be rationalized by
the expectation that as a result of the consumer’s switching the overall quality
level of goods and services in a market—not just the quality of the product
in question—would also suffer. In most standard consumer goods markets,
customers of a particular (branded) good will not be concerned about setting
off through their switching an additional quality deterioration with respect to
the remainder of themarket’s available goods.But in data-drivenmarketplaces,
high concentration and declining profitmargins within firmsmay causemarket
leaders to underinvest in quality, and the market leader’s bigger and more
diverse user base will cause smaller rivals to also reduce quality, lowering
quality standards across the market. The consumer’s behaviour, under such
circumstances, has the potential to determine to a large extent the quality level
of the market’s general backdrop.145
Loyal behaviour by consumers who at the same time are conscious of the
likely effects of their switching may therefore prevent the market’s overall
quality level from declining. And users care about the market’s quality level
as long as the quality of the firm’s service is important to them even after they
decide to switch.146 In data-driven marketplaces, most consumers continue
to be customers of the same firm regardless of whether they switch. Online
services rendered to users by dominant platforms give rise to externalities
imposed on other services or users so that the consumption experience of
one service by a user will have an effect on the consumption experience of
other services or users. An example are complementary services offered by
search engine operators that simultaneously provide email, maps, shopping
applications, and so forth, whose quality may deteriorate at the same time as
the quality of the platform’s main services also decline. Here, switching will
fail to enable users to cease being part of the respective market on which the
declining product manufacturer operates. If a consumer makes use of a price
comparison website operated by a dominant search engine platform of which
they have come to disapprove, they can switch to another search engine but
they cannot avoid being displeased as a user at a price comparison website that
continues to operate based on a product offered by a declining search engine
platform.
The Commission’s treatment of self-favouring therefore also seems to work
to preserve the firm’s own value in the loyal behaviour of their users, which
in turn may afford a benefit to the market’s overall quality level. While exit
typically must be seen as providing a strong incentive to the declining firm
to recover from a loss in quality, and the exiting customer is no longer













































































Advancing Quality Competition in Big Data Markets 533
concerned about the product or service after they have switched, in data-
driven marketplaces users must ordinarily continue to be apprehensive about
the product’s quality. If users of a dominant search engine switch, they will
remain at least to some extent consumers of the firm’s output, or will keep
being affected by the external effects that this output creates in the market as
a whole. Consumers will then have an interest in playing a part in the recovery
of the services of the firm from which they are considering exiting, even if only
indirectly, through intensified administrative practice.
All of this renders plain the usefulness of adapting Hirschman’s framework
for the present purposes. While exit normally is cast as the authoritative
paradigm to improve market efficiency, in data-driven marketplaces, there
often is increased pressure for quality to deteriorate so that voice, as an addi-
tional mechanism, compels firms to adjust.Giving voice to consumers through
intensified administrative practice then is closely intertwined with affording
consumers an exit option by way of market self-correction; addressing declines
in quality through voice will play a part in relation to those (aspects of) goods
and services where the results of poor performance generally are viewed as
being intolerable. Even if competition is lively for such goods and services (as
may be the case in some search engine markets), the presence of intensified
administrative practice bears witness to the existence of a strong public
concern to avoid disagreeable consequences of quality deteriorations.147 Con-
versely, in the absence of public opinion that the maintenance of a high level of
quality cannot be left to the market’s forces, exit is viewed as the predominant
mechanism for consumers to steer the economy into a broader range of choices
and back to the production of more effective quality improvements; as a result,
the consequences of diverging quality are tolerated from the beginning. And
voice also tends to play a role where consumers are uncertain about the quality
of goods and services, or are subordinate in this regard to the supplier. Exit,
on the other hand, plays a part where consumers are thought to be adept at
recognizing what they prefer. It is precisely the former concern that features
prominently in search engine markets. As has been recognized by Sergey Brin
and Lawrence Page, ‘[s]ince it is very difficult even for experts to evaluate
search engines, search engine bias is particularly insidious. . . . For example,
a search engine could add a small factor to search results from “friendly”
companies, and subtract a factor from results from competitors. This type
of bias is very difficult to detect but could still have a significant effect on
the market. Furthermore, advertising income often provides an incentive to
provide poor quality search results. . . . [W]e believe the issue of advertising
147 This may also be the case in traditional industries. For instance, where concerns about
health and safety are key, such as with air transportation, pharmaceuticals, education, or in
relation to complex technological products, public regulation is generally present. In data-
driven marketplaces, these concerns are pronounced because markets tend to tip and quality
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causes enough mixed incentives that it is crucial to have a competitive search
engine that is transparent . . . ’.148 In this sense, the juxtaposition of voice and
exit also reflects an institutional concern that the emphasis for the search
engine market’s functioning is not solely on the consumer but also on the
producer that sometimes ought to be given as much information as possible
about its own performance rather than simply having disgruntled customers
switch back and forth between several equally disappointing suppliers.149
Voice can then be demarcated from exit as a type of competition that is
meaningful when there are vital public demands to cure an insufficiently
appreciated problem. In that case, the employment of voice, rather than of
exit, is to be given increased attention.
VI. CONCLUSION
Legal doctrine has long tried to articulate a consistent rationale for a baseline
standard that may fit a dominant search engine’s preferential treatment of its
own related services into the CJEU’s framework for leveraging market power.
Conventional economic doctrine has put an emphasis on the consumer’s
ability to exit but this institutional arrangement, which is important as long
as the market’s structure is competitive, may not work sufficiently in the
digital economy where quality competition is predominant and firms are
in a position to maximize output at the expense of quality. Along the way,
an unexpected institutional arrangement—affording consumers the ability to
voice their concerns towards the firm—not only becomes more significant but
is disposed to be progressively undervalued. Appreciating voice as a useful
instrument for sustaining quality, however, requires competition law doctrine
to afford consumers an opportunity to govern markets from within a particular
segment rather than simply through switching between segments, and thus
crucially depends on the design of such institutional avenues of influence
that enable the transmission of consumers’ criticisms most efficiently. To this
end, voice is essentially put into effect by competition agencies and courts,
which continually apply the law to new situations. This article has shown
that the European Commission’s framing of the practice of self-favouring has
essentially achieved this goal for search engine markets. The Commission’s
view affords consumers an insider position with respect to a dominant search
engine’s services, while exit would demote the bulk of consumers to the stance
of outsider. Voice, in this way, may constitute a unique path of influence
148 Brin & Page, op. cit. supra note 62, at 3832.
149 Hirschman, op. cit. supra note 11, at 26–29. These issues are of growing concern in the US
as well, although the FTC’s approach to a dominant search engine’s practice of self-favouring
has been much more lenient in the past, see Fiona Scott Morton et al., Committee for the Study













































































Advancing Quality Competition in Big Data Markets 535
for consumers who associate their loyalty towards the firm with decision-
making, avenues of influence, and the governance of markets, taking the form
of an institutional channel of communication for consumers to express their
dissatisfaction when they experience difficulty in doing so.To this extent,much
of the economic theory that views exit as the predominant mechanism for
steering commerce into a broader range of choices and back to the production
of better product offerings omits an account of the consumer as helping to
shape the market’s backdrop and enabling the firm to restore its initial quality
advantage over rivals.
However, voice may be viewed not simply as a distinct theory of harm for
competition agencies and courts to apply but may also justify an account
that authorizes competition agencies to impose behavioural remedies that
make consumers’ voices heard effectively by digital platforms. In Google
Search (Shopping), rather than setting out a distinctive remedial package, the
Commission confined itself to inflict upon Google the obligation to ‘ensure
that Google treats competing comparison shopping services no less favourably
than its own comparison shopping service within its general search results
pages . . . irrespective of whether Google chooses to display a [separate]
Shopping Unit or another equivalent form of grouping links to or search
results from comparison shopping services’.150 While the adoption of an open-
ended remedial approach is uncontested in academic literature,151 Article
7 (1) of Regulation 1/2003 stipulates that any remedy must be effective in
bringing an infringement of Article 102 TFEU to an end.152 Here, the practice
of self-favouring may present distinctive challenges to competition agencies
and courts, as several commentators and practice groups have pointed out
in response to Google’s chosen remedy. Specifically, Google implemented an
arm’s-length auction mechanism for every website to bid for display places
presented in a separate Shopping Unit at the top of the general search results
page. The displayed results include both direct links to merchants’ products
and to comparison shopping websites (including Google Shopping) and any
website participates in the auction in the same way. Although this mechanism
formally complies with the principle of equal treatment,Google’s participation
in the auction as an independent unit that has to ensure its individual profit
and the display of direct product links in effect results in upward pricing
pressure on competitors’ auction bids, enabling Google to extract sizeable
margins away from rivals and making it more likely for consumers to click
150 Case AT.39740,Google Search (Shopping), para 699.
151 For an overview see Bo Vesterdorf & Kyriakos Fountoukakos, An Appraisal of the Remedy
in the Commission’s Google Search (Shopping) Decision and a Guide to its Interpretation
in Light of an Analytical Reading of the Case Law, 9 Journal of European Competition Law &
Practice, 3 (2018), pointing out that an undertaking’s right to receive commercially reasonable,
market-based compensation for supplying rivals with a valuable input is consistent with the
case law.
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on merchants’ websites rather than on comparison shopping websites’ links.
What is more, the auction mechanism itself is alleged to create a distorting
contest between large retailers who want to be placed visibly on Google’s
Shopping Unit, squeezing out smaller ones, and depriving consumers of the
benefit of a thriving comparison shopping market based on ‘relevance’ (for
example, on the scope of products and services covered, the inclusion of
consumers’ ratings or reviews, and on other nonmonetary parameters such
as the capability of products, and so forth).153 This may appear to argue
for competition agencies to ensure that the remedy does not simply comply
with the formal principle of equal treatment but that it will amount to the
same effect in practice.154 Similarly, but beyond the scope of this article, the
idea of voice may call for stronger ex ante consumer law protection measures
in digital markets. A case in point is the recent endorsement in the EU of
the rules set out in Regulation 2019/1150 to provide appropriate incentives
to promote fairness and transparency, especially as regards the ranking of
corporate website users in the search results generated by online search
engines.155 These rules require online search engines to disclose, among
other things, in an easily understandable and accessible manner, the main
parameters determining their rankings, including the criteria used if a website’s
own offers are treated differently from those of other corporate website users.
While it remains unclear whether consumers themselves will be able to enforce
direct claims from these rules, the establishment of a competitive, fair, and
transparent online ecosystem is fundamentally aimed at improving consumers’
choice and welfare.156 Yet, if product quality is a key competitive concern in
the digital economy, such rules may hardly be seen as a defence to a dominant
search engine’s opaque practice of self-favouring, but they may nevertheless
point to a willingness of market regulatory rulemakers to establish some
limiting principles for a dominant undertaking’s liability in offering ranking
and selection algorithms.157
153 See Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs AISBL,Consumer Concerns with Google’s
Non-Compliant Remedy in Antitrust Shopping Case (2019), <https://www.beuc.eu/publications/
beuc-x-2019-020_google_non-compliant_remedy_in_antitrust_shopping_case.pdf> accessed
15 November 2019; Andres Caro, Leveraging Market Power Online: The Google Shopping
Case, 17 Competition Law Journal, 49 (2018).
154 In this direction Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye & Heike Schweitzer, op. cit.
supra note 128, at 67–68 arguing that where self-favouring has significantly benefited a platform
or its subsidiary in improving its market position, it may be necessary for the remedy to ensure
that disadvantaged competitors may regain strength by compensating them for their reduced
visibility in the past. In the present case, alternatives might consist in price caps or the exclusive
promotion of organic search, whereby possible chilling and free-riding effects would have to be
balanced against exclusionary, extraction, and leveraging effects.
155 Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of 20 June 2019, OJ 2019 L 186/57.
156 Ibid., paras 3–4, 8, 24, 26, 30.
157 See Nicolo Zingales, Google Shopping. Beware of ‘Self-Favouring’ in a World of Algorithmic
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Taken as a whole, this does not suggest that competition policy should solely
(or even predominantly) rely on voice. A propensity towards exclusive resort
to one mode or another can scarcely do justice to the distinctive characteristics
of each, let alone to their application to particular market conditions. As
Hirschman himself concludes, the distinction between exit and voice ‘does not
come out with a firm prescription for some optimal mix of exit or voice, nor
does it wish to accredit the notion that each institution requires its ownmix that
could be gradually approached by trial and error’.158 But the fact that voice
sometimes may bring about improved market outcomes ought not to preclude
us from appreciating its qualities. To this extent, Hirschman’s frame is most
suitable for deepening our sense of how data-driven marketplaces operate.
158 Hirschman, op. cit. supra note 11, at 124.
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